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Poetry as Knowing 
Barbara Folkart 
The answers to all the great questions lie in the grain of the world. 
Hans Blumenberg 
The everyday is always the hardest to explain. 
Hubert Reeves 
Like the pure sciences, poetry is first and foremost a cognitive 
undertaking, one of the most stringent modes of knowing that exist. 
Everything about it is shaped by the search for insight, or even truth. 
And the truth of a poem is, of course, something that goes far beyond 
paraphrasable propositional content : Yeats's elegy "In Memory of Eva 
Gore-Booth and Con Markiewicz" revolves about a proposition that 
has been around as long as humanity, but infinitely exceeds 
formulations like "all men are mortar' or even the beautiful, but 
already-said, "all flesh is like the grass". Truth in poetry would seem to 
be propositional content made available as direct experience, amplified 
into directly felt insight. 
The irreducible truth of a poem is a direct outgrowth of its 
flesh — its imagery, soundplay, rhythms. It's the musicality of Yeats's 
elegy that makes us feel the mortality of the two lovely girls in silk 
kimonos : line 21, echoing the sound pattern of line 2 (Paulin, 1998, 
p. 3), juxtaposes the fact of their death with the recollection of their 
beauty, and makes us feel mortality, feel it directly, and so come to 
know it — precisely as we all of a sudden feel and know, in certain 
excruciating instants of real life. The poem, here, is doing the work of 
the epiphany-instants that come to all of us at mercifully rare intervals. 
It's grotesque, I think, to set the esthetic up as an airy-fairy 
category on its own, and then make hard and fast distinctions between 
the esthetic and the cognitive. It's absurd to set the threshold of 
cognition so high that it excludes all but the rational, linear-logicked 
forms of mental activity : cognition, as the neuroscientists will tell you, 
is often downright illogical. And it's hugely erroneous to try and seal 
the cognitive and the emotional off from one another in leak-proof 
compartments. What gets called "the esthetic" is merely a special, high-
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intensity case of "the cognitive". Poetic cognition involves affect and 
body as well as the more disembodied kind of knowing that 
neuroscientists refer to as declarative intelligence. 
A great poem, like a great theory in physics, is an 
inexhaustible inscape.1 The truth of such a poem takes reams and reams 
of exegesis to unpack, eluding and exceeding endless series of more or 
less propositional paraphrases. Translation, of course, is one way of 
unpacking a poem. Translations of poetry (as opposed to translations 
that succeed in being poems) are little more than successive 
approximations; it takes an unending series of translations, from the 
crib to the verse rendering, to even begin to approximate the poem, 
which remains an asymptote they'll never quite reach (the Humpty-
Dumpty effect I've referred to elsewhere : see Folkart, "Inventing the 
Past", 1998). 
Frankly, I don't know of any "strong" poetry, painting, 
sculpture, music that I don't feel relevant to the business of being in the 
world. Non-figurative art is not art that has nothing to say about the 
world : it does, after all, connect with the body and the emotions, which 
are prime ways of being in the world and knowing. For all their 
propositional opacity, Zukofsky's "80 Flowers" enact their referents 
(or at the very least, the poet's response to these referents, his way of 
experiencing them). A-referential poetry such as John Ashbery's 
creates, through its inflections, speech rhythms and discursive 
strategies, a compelling sense of subject-in-the-poem, and perhaps even 
a diffuse sense of world : a ceaselessly kaleidoscoping, soft-focus 
America, filmed through a lens smeared with Vaseline. Ashbery's 
poetry systematically deflects our desire for sustained reference to our 
common experience, but nonetheless constructs a sense of subject-in-
world, and certainly, if Harold Bloom is to be believed, a statement 
about the business of making poetry out of world. Non-figurative art 
has its own system of truth value. It can still show us a great deal about 
the world, even as it tells us next to nothing : after all, the great answers 
all lie in the unexplored, as yet un-conceptualized grain of the world. 
And non-figurative art is just a special case : there is still poetry out 
there, masses of it, which fully intends to show, and sometimes even 
tell us, what it is to be in the world. 
As opposed to light verse, which exhibits a huge degree of 
congruence with the already-said at the levels of both form and 
content, the business of poetry is to probe deeper into the as yet un-
conceptualized grain of experience, the hidden layers of our being in 
the world. By the end of a (successful) poem, the poet winds up 
knowing more than she thought she knew at the outset. The initial 
intuition (whether you want to think of it as a gift from the gods, or as 
1
 I'm reversing here the directionality of F. David Peat's comparison of poetry 
and physics (Peat, 1997, p. 114). 
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sewerage backing up from the unconscious mind) unfolds into a 
statement that makes sense of at least some small part of the world. 
And this is precisely what I mean by truth, as opposed to fact, 
which is the province of the instrumental uses of language, including 
the outermost, most immediate layers of science. Truth, for me, is an 
overarching reading of the world, a sense and unity and meaning 
constructed out of the raw materials of life — one of many possible 
models, but a model that distinguishes itself by its poignancy, its 
coherence, its elegance (elegance in the mathematical and scientific 
sense of simplicity, efficacy, being able to account for the most with 
the least). To the extent that they succeed, in places, in being poetry, 
Ted Hughes's recently published Birthday Letters are of interest for 
their truth content, not as fact-fodder for the obscene little cottage 
industry that's grown up around the Hughes-Plath marriage and its 
tragic outcome (hard to think of a greater insult to Plath's poetry, or of 
anything that would have outraged her as much as the way her poetry 
has been subordinated to her suicide). 
Poetry, then, like the pure sciences, is a way of modelling the 
world. There is no incompatibility whatsoever between poetic vision 
and the insights generated by scientific or sometimes even scholarly 
discourse. And the feedback loops of artistic creation are pretty much 
the same as the feedback loops of scientific creativity : the intuitions 
that inform the best research can be remarkably close to the kind of 
insight poetry arises from. Art historian Beth Williamson has 
conjectured that the Virgins swooning at the foot of the Cross, in 14th 
century European painting, were in fact experiencing, at their son's 
death, the physical sufferings they hadn't experienced in childbirth. 
Williamson, here, is operating out of a truly poetic insight : she is in 
fact recovering the creative impulse of the original artists. This 
intuition was probably building up as she slogged through her 
iconography, slide after slide; it then had to be confirmed (or 
disproved) with additional hard-nosed data. In other words, the spark is 
the way the data come together, all of a sudden, and this intuition goes 
on to inform the subsequent research. 
You don't have to be religious to see how poetic Williamson's 
insight is, and how rich it is in theological implications. Even if her 
intuition turned out not to coincide with the intention of the original 
artists, it enriches our perception of these pieces, it's one of the 
readings that these strutture aperte can support. Insights like this have 
an esthetic fullness that's very much like the criterion of elegance in 
mathematics and physics. 
Poetry, then, is about knowing. Poetry is not about being 
decorative : its language is anything but an ornamental overlay. Form is 
decorative only to the illiterate : the installation artist who sets out to 
co-opt the Holocaust, but winds up printing the Hebrew prayer she's 
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using upside down; the tone-deaf academic who records his 
answerphone message over a hideously off-pitch re-taping of the 
Italian Concerto, in a bid to impress his callers with his musical 
sensitivity. For the competent receiver, art is acutely, intensely 
functional. 
Nor is poetry about "expression", or "self-expression". The 
amorphously therapeutic, let-it-all-hang-out mode of writing ex-presses 
(squeezes out) nothing the writer didn't know before he started. While 
the authentic poem does indeed work by provoking an emotional 
response, its emotional impact, I will be arguing later on, is a response 
to its truth-value, not a wallowing self-indulgence. The emotional 
response to poetry is no more decorative than the form of the poem. 
Emotion is at the very core, not only of the poetic response, but even 
more importantly of the cognitive processes peculiar to art. In a word, 
the emotional inputs and responses involved in the processes of making 
and receiving poetry play a huge role and deserve more than the 
trivializing "expressive" slots allocated to them in the general-purpose 
"communicative" models that used to be so trendy in translation 
studies.2 
Nor is poetry about being a pure language object : the 
poem — even the non-figurative one — is anything but a flat 
contraption, crafted and delighted in as a string of words at the surface 
of the paper, or a string of sounds in the air between a reader's mouth 
and a listener's ear. How could it be (given language's incoercible 
tendency to figure the extra-linguistic), when music (which could so 
much more readily be conceived of as a rule-governed, purely 
positional configuration) generates in us such an awesome and 
compelling sense of truth? 
It's altogether fallacious to privilege the self-referentiality of 
a poem over its referentiality : the poetic text is a double structure, 
whose very constructedness (its lettre, its materiality, what it does with 
the raw materials inherited from the tribal idiom) is an integral part of 
the way the poem makes sense. It's the acoustic texture of Yeats's 
elegy, the way line 21 repeats the vowel sounds of line 2, that makes a 
statement about time passing, or rather shows time passing, and what it 
does to us. Poetry is a way of being in the world, and making meaning 
of it. 
Authentic poems are "full", not flat entities : the outcome of 
the cognitive processes embodied in the poem is a rich and resonant 
2
 Even Jakobson's model : sure, it's nice to be able to come up with a function 
centred about one of the actants in the communicative model, and the 
expressive function may even exist — but not in poetry. Self-expression is not 
what drives poetry. Poetry is about working towards an understanding of the 
world, and of the way we are in the world. 
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sense of "real", not a bundle of,sharp, disembodied particles of pure 
meaning like the noèmes the ÉSITiens like to bandy about. And 
contrary to the "in-one-end-out-the-other" view of meaning, the 
outcome of the cognitive process, at the reception end, is a joint 
construction between the poem and its receptor, not a re-construction 
of some abstraction pre-existing in the mind of the poet. In short, what 
I like to refer to as the "real" of the poem is, to use Hjelmslev's 
terminology, substance, not form : the rich, fuzzy-foisonnant, resonant 
sense of world that gets constructed more or less idiosyncratically by 
each reader, in function of her own vécu, around the core scenario 
provided by the poem. 
Shakespeare, in his sonnets, may indeed have been working 
within the elaborate set of formal constraints analyzed in Helen 
Vendler's recent book (see Paulin, 1998). Sonnets are easy to write, 
and there's nothing implausible about a virtuoso poet's wanting to "up 
the ante", just to see what will happen : changez les contraintes, il en 
sortira autre chose (Burgelin, 1996). After all, formal gaming was so 
highly developed in the late middle ages and on into the Renaissance 
that it kept a number of literary scholars busy, back in the sixties, 
taking Villon apart in search of encrypted obscenities. But anagrams, 
couplet ties, and the like, are merely constraints, boundary conditions, 
part of the givens (exactly like Perec setting himself the task of writing 
La Disparition without once using the letter -e, and seeing what kind of 
lexis and syntax he'd be forced into by the unavailability of forms like 
le, or past participles of the first conjugation). And such actualized pre-
constraints are perhaps the least interesting aspect of the poems' 
textures and textualities. How Shakespeare's sonnets work, and have 
worked for centuries of receivers, is by creating, through their textures, 
a sense of "real" and a sense of subject, that urgent personal voice 
(Nandy, 1998, p. 5) which is what readers have been responding to 
over the centuries : mind-games are fine, but the language play of the 
sonnets serves vision, and emotion. 
Art, I would claim is always full : it nudges the receiver into 
constructing a something and a someone behind the canvas or the page. 
Even when it enters the realm of the abstract or the a-referential, it is 
never just a mind-game : a totally non-figurative Jackson Pollock 
speaks to the viewer's body and emotions, through its rhythms and 
colours. Art is art by its ability to create world. 
Pushed to the extreme, my position is that a string of words 
without a world behind it is not a text, let alone a poem. Nor can a 
string of words without a sense of subject behind it be a poem. That 
sense of subject is as much a textual construct, or rather a construct 
extrapolated out of the text, as is the "real" that gets constructed in the 
reader's mind — and it takes a full-formed text to create such a sense 
of subject. (True, even the klunkiest string of words will create a kind 
of sense of subject — except that the subject you extrapolate from a 
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klunky string of words is a klutz, not someone you'd be interested in 
knowing.) 
Pushed to the extreme, my position is that the sense of "an 
urgent personal voice" that arises in the transaction between reader and 
poem is a condition sine qua non of the poetic experience. What I am 
not talking about here is the trivializing category of "individuality" that 
gets slotted into the all-purpose communicative models — the ones that 
reduce poetic language to "occasional personal idiosyncracies" and 
"singularities", and treat "voice" as a whimsical oddity, a quirk or a 
fluke. Such models are incapable of coming to terms with what the 
poet is doing with her language; they fail to understand that poetry is a 
serious undertaking with a serious outcome. 
In short, poets are no more in the business of making pretty, or 
letting it all hang out, or constructing gratuitious, airy-fairy, 
disconnected-from-the-real word-contraptions than are molecular 
biologists or computer nerds. What poets actually try to do, I believe, is 
put themselves into un-mediated contact with the grit of existence, the 
grain of the world (which, as Hans Blumenberg once remarked, is 
where the answers to all the great questions lie). 
Digging into the continuum is a cognitive imperative : in order 
to maintain our sense of contact with the "real" we have to probe 
deeper and further into it, and we're probably hard-wired to do so. Not 
only is the world inexhaustible (semiosis is indeed bottomless), but the 
already-said has a way of drying up and peeling away from the real, 
failing us, faltering out from underneath us, desiccating into repetitive 
truism. Whether we're doing science or writing poetry, we have to be 
periodically "shorn of our preconceptions" if we are to "reconstruct our 
consciousness of reality in a more perfect order"3. I like to call it 
restless semiosis : in order to do justice to the world, poets delve deeper 
into its grain, deeper than ever before into the amorphous business of 
being. 
This they do by "making it new". Poetry is a "counter-
idiomatic" practise, one that grates against the words of the tribe, its 
received ideas and its verities — the already-said, the already-thought, 
the already-perceived. The already-known is a repository of tribal 
3
 I'm quoting here from German philosopher Hubert Crehan and American 
poet Kennern Sawyer, both cited on page 2 of the documentation 
accompanying the National Gallery of Canada's permanent collection of 
Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, Jackson Pollock et ai The full quote from 
Hubert Crehan is : 
[...] the monstrous black and red shapes [...] evoke a spiritual charge 
akin to those profound emotions produced by the occasional 
scientific or philosophical utterances that reconstruct our 
consciousness of reality in a more perfect order. 
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experience, abstracted from the messy continuum, and cleaned up. The 
lexicon is an abstract grid, a glossy veneer over the mess and murk of 
the real. The poet reverses the process of abstraction, reconstitutes 
some of the mess behind the lexicon, turns words back into world and 
tries to make sense of the raw new layers she's just uncovered. Poetry, 
to borrow Richard Wilbur's beautiful line, loses all that it touches back 
to wonder. 
Poetry, like any other radical cognitive undertaking, 
challenges the templates on which categorical perception is founded, 
tries to deracinate our deep-rooted preferences for what we have 
previously been exposed to. Templates are inherently abstractions 
arrived at by filtering out any aspects of the real considered irrelevant 
to the business at hand. But the new is always on the fringes of the 
business at hand — the new is what got filtered out when the previous 
set of templates formed. 
As opposed to the "cooked" knowledge of the tribe, the 
schemata and the categorical perceptions that override fresh input from 
the world, what the poet works with is the buzz of actual perception. 
There's nothing like being forced up against the real, with the slick 
veneer of the already-known peeled back, to make you know. Consider 
the TWA disaster, in the summer of 1996 — weeks and weeks of 
media coverage, words on words, photos, story lines fraying 
themselves threadbare. Then, 18 months later, the starkly laconic 
excerpts from the air traffic contrôler's tapes : flat professional pilot 
voices, one reporting an explosion at nine o'clock, flat professional 
traffic controller voices juggling flights and scanning for the missing 
aircraft, and then a single voice, pilot or air-traffic controller, saying in 
his flat American twang : that must have been him — God bless him. 
Finally, at the edge of that reiterated instant, you felt you knew what 
had happened. 
At its best, poetry, too, operates at the edge of the instant. A 
teen-age Rimbaud gropes a half-naked servant girl, and the big trees 
swishing along the windows put us right into the resonant core of that 
afternoon. And here is Ted Hughes, more than forty years after the fact, 
writing of Sylvia Plath, the day he married her : 
In that echo-gaunt, weekday chancel 
I see you 
Wrestling to contain your flames 
In your pink wool knitted dress 
And in your eye-pupils — great cut jewels 
Jostling their tear-flames, truly like big jewels 
Shaken in a dice-cup and held up to me. 
These lines are remarkable for the way they pull Plath back out of the 
flux, bodily, in the astonishing physical, emotional, spiritual vibrancy 
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she must have had, standing in the chancel ofthat church, at the age of 
24. The cognitive impact of the poem — that stunning sense of exactly 
how Plath was on that June afternoon in 1956 — arises from the way 
the poem inhabits its instant, bringing it from latent to full-blown truth, 
forty years after the fact. The truth of Hughes's poem is in the way it 
does justice to the instant. 
Language, too, has to be renewed, if poetry is to fulfill its 
cognitive vocation. Do not use the rotted names, wrote Wallace 
Stevens : the words of the tribe encapsulate the knowledge of the tribe. 
What Meschonnic (un travail dans les ressources du langage), Berman 
(parlance; un texte qui est premier dans son propre espace de langue) 
and Ladmiral (du français potentiel) were all talking about (if they 
could only have got their act together) was using language 
innovatively, actualizing its latent ressources in a way that makes it 
adequate to the insights it needs to convey, empowering it to do justice 
to the world. (As far as I'm concerned, the whole sourcier-cibliste flap 
is a giant cockup. Respecting the otherness of the text has nothing to do 
with replicating its linguistic micro-structures, and everything to do 
with coming to terms with it as an original, un texte qui est premier 
dans son propre espace de langue, a text that innovates within its own 
cultural and language framework, un texte qui fraie.) 
And "form", in authentic poetry, whether or not it evolves out 
of set prosodie constraints, plays an all-important part in making 
language new enough so that it no longer clouds the world with its 
ready-made vision. As in mathematics, where elegance is what 
distinguishes the genius proof from the hack proof, as in the pure 
sciences, where the criterion of mathematical beauty can be a helpful 
guide, form provides a powerful cognitive impulsion, one that forces 
the poet into knowing more than she thought she did. The prosody, 
rhythm and soundplay of an authentic poem, like the stylized 
constraints of, say, quantum physics, play an essential role in the 
construction of new truth-models. 
Here again, the contrast with light verse is instructive. Form, 
in light verse, is freestanding, and ostentatious. Its deliberately 
intrusive nature is part of what makes light verse fun. Systematic end-
stopping ensures that the presence of the line is felt, line after line; 
rumpy-pumpy scansion makes the metrical grid inescapable; rhymes 
are as outlandish as possible, with maximal phonetic overlap and 
grotesque rather than enlightening lexical overlaps (actually, close-to-
zero overlaps) — Yule : pasta-fasoul, or suitor : computer : do to 'er, 
in limericks, as opposed to hard : heart in a "serious" poem). Form, in 
light verse, is its own function; its sole purpose is to be form, blatantly, 
unmistakably so : light verse s'avance en se désignant du doigt. 
Content-wise, there is a high degree of adequation with the already-
said. Clichés may actually be cultivated; images must on no account be 
so fresh, or so true, as to take our breath away. Above all, there is wit 
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in light verse, but not vision. Poetry and light verse, then, are radically 
different ways of being in the world, they have altogether different 
finalities and operate out of radically different stances. 
The form of an authentic poem is never obtrusive, let alone 
freestanding : you cannot peel it way from what the poem has to tell us. 
The language of a poem is no more amovible than the equations in a 
biochemistry textbook. What ultimately gets analyzed as metaphor is a 
discovery procedure, a cognitive break-through (or at the very least, a 
cognitive tension that may resolve itself in deeper insight). Imagery 
puts us into the pulp of the instant; rhythm is the body's way of moving 
us into the transcendent (and in the grave my bones will sway, says the 
Hebrew prayer of glorification; just think of all the stompin and swayin 
that goes on at gospel services). Soundplay and imagery manufacture 
unforeseen cognitive relationships out of phonetic and visual 
similarities : profound images and rhymes (as opposed to trivial ones) 
induce meanings that are newer, and go deeper, insights that are 
fresher, and more authentic, and will stay with us longer, than the 
meanings of the lexicon. 
Poetic form — a line like Robert Lowell's bright sky, bright 
sky, carbon scarred with ciphers — establishes a profound link 
between the esthetic and the cognitive, via the affective and the 
physical. Neurologically speaking, there's probably nothing the least 
bit mysterious about the sound-sense coupling posited by Jakobson (the 
famous statement to the effect that in poetic discourse, any similarity at 
the level of sound induces similarity or dissimilarity at the level of 
meaning) : sound similarity induces the receiver to hold the words 
together in his working memory, thus setting them up for comparison 
and pre-disposing him to discover an overlapping or an anti-
overlapping of the two bundles of semantic features.4 The more 
illuminating the overlap, the greater the discovery, or "uncovery" value 
of the rhyme. In other words, soundplay and rhyme are a mechanism 
for making us attend to the words involved, thus bringing to the surface 
any latent similarities or dissimilarities at the level of semantic features. 
(I am not referring here to the half-assed view that there exist pre-
encoded sound-emotion pairings, with specific sounds invested, once 
and for all, with specific emotional values; phonostylistics, as far as 
I'm concerned, belongs in the same trash bin as the theories of abstract 
art Adam Gopnik has referred to, "earnestly dopey in their insistence 
that abstract art mechanically encrypted particular emotions, with big 
red blotches equalling excitement, droopy forms making you feel sad, 
and so on" (Gopnik, 1998, p. 75). 
4
 Which is precisely what happens when Tom Paulin finally discovers why line 
21 of the Yeats elegy has always brought him to the verge of tears : the longer 
span of the coupling (19 lines) explains why it took years for Paulin to 
conceptualize what his ear and his heart's ear had understood the very first 
time, perhaps, he ever heard the poem. 
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Yet the recourse to after-the-fact categories such as 
"metaphor", "imagery", "sound play" is misleading and profoundly 
reductive; I have no intention, here, of buying into the static-sclerotic 
"literary devices" mindset, useful as it may be for more perfunctory 
forms of discussion. I find it profoundly repugnant to reify and 
inertialize something as proactive, as heuristic, as fluid as the writing of 
poetry into something called "poetic language", which can then be 
broken down, good-burgherly, into a hardware store of tricks 'n tools. 
The pedantic focus on "figures" is a trivializing, a non-
practitioner's view of writing, one that postulates a freestanding entity 
knowable as "literary language" and then degrades it to an inventory of 
spare parts such as metaphor, alliteration, sound-play — tricks of the 
trade that get pulled off the shelf or out of the toolbox. What I despise 
about this view is the way it reduces writing to categories of the 
already-said, before it even gets written : analysis, with its ready-made 
categories, comes after the fact; writing, though, is inaugural. Writing 
isfrayage. 
In opposition to the profoundly inertial "literary devices" view 
of things, I see writing as a discovery procedure, un saut dans le vide, 
avec l'inévitable risque de se casser la gueule. The writer who 
produces what will later come to be analyzed as metaphor is taking the 
world in and giving it voice, at an instant of particular intensity and 
authenticity. Metaphor is process not product, structuring, not structure, 
perception, not percept. What will later — once it has cooled off and 
fallen into the domaine of the already-said — be analyzed as a 
rhetorical procedure is quite simply the way the poet was being in the 
world as she struggled against the words and world of the tribe. What 
drives segments that will later be perceived as sound-play are pulsions, 
not the decision or the desire to use alliteration. Juxtaposition is the 
unconscious processing its experience, the non-linear logic of images 
and affect, a logic of the lower levels, the unsemiotized regions of 
experience — those for which we have no ready-made schemata and 
labels. Writing poetry, in a word, is not a linear-logicked, get-me-to-
the-top-of-the-heap career move. 
In any authentic poem, then, what gets analyzed after the fact 
as "device" is anything but. The formal patternings of a poem are a 
way of making sense of the world. The sound and sense similarities 
that get referred to as metaphor, imagery and rhyme generate new 
insights, by forcing unexpected overlaps between previously unrelated 
fragments of experience and inducing common ground among 
disparates. What we react to as rhythm (not metre) is a way of being in 
the world; it's the body, breathing, moving, desiring, setting us up for 
what generally gets referred to as the spiritual. After all, mind is flesh, 
and so is what gets called "soul". 
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Form I like to think of as the body of truth. And poetry — as 
opposed to the abstractified, bloodless wisdom which we all, as proper 
members of the tribe, have stored in us — poetry is carnal knowledge 
of the world. Knowing through sensory inputs of all sorts (as opposed 
to categorical perception) is a fundamental way of "knowing new". The 
feedback loop between body and emotions has received lots of 
attention : physical input plays a major role in stimulating emotional 
reactions — which in turn manifest themselves through various arousal 
systems and seem, indeed, to be an evolutionary mechanism for 
making us attend to physical inputs. I'll be speculating later on about 
the role emotions play in the cognitive pathways set in motion by 
poetry. 
Every bit as important is the feedback loop between bodily 
experience and cognition, the way art and understanding are grounded 
in the body. One thing that's always struck me, in the realm of music, 
is how the utterly physical dance-rhythms so evident in, say, the Bach 
suites for unaccompanied cello or violin are a way into an utterly 
transcendent statement about the world : 
Sarabands and gavottes 
rasp into metaphysics, 
the world's sadness and flux 
take flesh 
in rhythm and phrase 
This sort of pathway, from the carnal to the cognitive, is by no 
means unique to the arts : physicists like David Böhm and Albert 
Einstein are reported to have placed great trust in bodily perception as a 
way of working out even the most abstruse theoretical constructs. 
Already, as an undergraduate grappling with the kinetics of the 
gyroscope, Böhm is said to have got into the skin of a gyroscope, so to 
speak : 
Once, as he was walking in the country, he imagined himself as a 
gyroscope, and through some form of muscular interiorization, he 
was able to understand the nature of its motion. In this way he 
worked out, within his own body, the behavior of gyroscopes. The 
formulae and the mathematics would come later, as a formal way of 
explaining his insight. 
From very early on in his scientific career, Böhm trusted 
this interior, intuitive display as a more reliable way of arriving at 
solutions. Later, when he met and talked with Einstein, he learned 
that he too experienced subtle, internal muscular sensations that 
appeared to lie much deeper than ordinary rational and discursive 
thought (Peat, 1997, p. 36). 
And it's the sense of embodiment, I would claim, that gives 
rise to the impression ofveridiction in the poetry that moves us. What 
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Hughes gives us, in the last lines of his "Pink knit dress" poem, is the 
vibrancy, the intensity of the young Sylvia Plath — a sense of how she 
really was. In this stanza, at least, Hughes has pulled Plath back from 
the brink of myth and stereotype and cheap ideological exploitation — 
he has given her to us in the flesh. And he's done it so much better, in 
seven lines, than all the diatribes spewed out by people who, in the last 
analysis, don't give a shit about her poetry. 
Poetry, then, is a mode of knowing that owes much of its 
power to the way it mobilizes direct, bodily perception. And our 
response to poetry (at once a response and a signal that we are in the 
presence of truth) is a bodily one. Emily Dickinson (#1480) writes of 
The fascinating chill that music leaves. We're all familiar with the hair-
raising sensation (it's actually called the pilomotor reflex) we get when 
we're unusually moved by an idea or a piece of art : human beings 
respond to the highest mental and spiritual achievements of their 
culture with the same reflex that raises the hairs on a dog's back3. 
By giving it form, making it new, forcing us out of the 
lexicalized verities that have gone stale on us, poetry makes us feel our 
way to new truths, or to a gut knowledge of old ones. Poetry isn't the 
only type of artifact that can give us the impression of being 
dangerously close to some god flaming in a bush : a beautiful scientific 
or mathematical demonstration will also do it for you, as will a 
particularly elegant idea, whether in the free state or embodied in a 
machine. I like to call it the burning-bush syndrome, and for me it's a 
signal that an unusually high level of truth, or ordering, has been 
reached, or at least that the idea, or the poem has enabled you to acceed 
to a higher level of understanding. For me, this "high-energy" state that 
accompanies whole-body perception is a litmus test, a sure sign that a 
scientific theory or a poem has pulled together strands that had 
formerly seemed unrelated, that the painting or the idea or the machine 
in which the idea is embodied has moved you forward, in a cognitive 
sense.6 
The compelling quality of art, the way it makes you attend to 
it, overriding all but the most urgent business at hand, is a sign (that 
you recognize), it has something to say that's of importance to you — 
exactly as the emotional systems wired into our brains as specialized 
5
 I'm quoting novelist Pat Barker (1995 [1993], p. 232), who is in turn basing 
her remark on the work of the early twentieth-century neurologist and social 
anthropologist W.H.R. Rivers. 
6
 This, incidentally, might account for why the poetry that blows X away may 
well leave Y cold : maybe Y already knew what X has only just comprehended 
through the poem — assuming, of course, that poetry doesn't leave Y totally 
indifferent, which is okay, too. 
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neural circuits have evolved to make us attend to physical inputs from 
situations that are crucial to our survival and reproduction. 
Poetry, in short, makes you feel your way to truth. Hence its 
maïeutic function. Authentic poems provide only the thin-rich 
indications you need to work it through for yourself : poetry, said Walt 
Whitman, seldomer tells a thing than suggests or necessitates it. They 
work by juxtaposition and evocation rather than linear-logicked 
discourse, because that's what the unconscious works with, and the 
unconscious (in the neuroscientific even more so than the Freudian 
sense) is where much of our affect comes from. 
Which brings me to the cognitive uses of emotion — more 
precisely, to the role of affect in the cognitive pathways peculiar to art. 
As both a reader and a writer of poetry, I would postulate that affect is, 
in its own way, a mode of knowing. The wiring of the brain is such that 
"the connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems 
are stronger than the connections from the cognitive to the emotional 
systems" (LeDoux, 1996, p. 19). And for good reason : the emotional 
systems, as parts of the ancestral brain, have a more immediate 
involvement with survival and reproduction. My knowledge of 
neuroscience wouldn't fill a thimble, and godforbid that I should lapse 
into the kind of crap science academics in the humanities have so 
rightly been taken to task for, but I'm inclined to guess that the 
emotions aroused by poetry are integrated into specific neural circuits, 
with physical inputs such as rhythm and soundplay and visuals 
producing somatic arousal which in turn creates emotional responses 
that get "echoed" in the regions of the cortex which are the site of 
declarative intelligence — cognition in the narrowest sense of the 
word. (It would be truly interesting to see if people whose emotional 
reactions have been blunted by damage to their spinal cords, which 
severely limits the amount of somatic input they receive, also lose part 
of whatever receptivity to art they may once have had.) 
What makes the esthetic so rich is the way the cognitive feeds 
back into the neural circuits in the ancestral brain. The musical 
experience, for example, is a culturally conditioned emotional feedback 
loop if ever there was one. There's nothing inherently "sad" about the 
minor mode; the "sadness" we associate with the minor keys is a 
cultural convention that has taken hold in Western music only in the 
last couple of centuries. And once we get beyond the raw material of 
the musical idiom, far subtler phenomena come into play : the piercing 
sadness we perceive in so much of Ravel's writing for the piano must 
be the end product of a supremely intricate feedback from the cortex to 
the ancestral brain and back. Our response to art may well build on 
evolutionary priming, which predisposes us to attend to certain stimuli 
more readily than to others. 
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It's clear to me, anyway, but I'm predicating this on my own 
type of response to poetry, that truth which has lost its emotional edge 
dries out into verity. The "winnowing process by which art begins to 
look more like its period than like itself (Gopnick, 1998, p. 77) 
coincides with a loss of emotional intensity. Texts that no longer speak 
to us with an "urgent personal voice" get Iexicalized and resorbed into 
the idiom. Newness is an affective, as well as a cognitive imperative. 
The miracle texts have enough individuality, enough originality, depth, 
validity and authenticity to remain parole du matin, to borrow 
Berman's lovely expression (Berman, 1985, p. 96). 
The link between affect and cognition works both ways. 
Novelist Pat Barker has remarked that the consolation of her 
uncompromisingly desolate World War I trilogy, The Ghost Road, lies 
in the trilogy's/or/?*. What I think she meant was that form could make 
sense and pull something, at least, back out of the flux. She may well 
be wrong : the slaughter of young men in the trenches, like the 
Holocaust, has nothing to teach us — but we're compelled to worry 
meaning out of atrocities as a way of consoling ourselves. 
So how does all this tie in with the problematics of 
translation? 
The very fact that poetry is so intolerant of the already-said is 
what makes it refractory to translation : the poem taps into the unused 
potential of its linguistic raw material to forge its own idiosyncratic 
signifiers (hence the irreplicability of what Berman referred to as la 
lettre). Most practitioners, though, conceive of translation as a way of 
replicating (their own limited version of) what's already there. The 
result is seldom, if ever, poetry. 
As everyone knows (or claims to know), there are translations 
of poems, and then there are translations that actually are poems. The 
latter are what I refer to as writerly translations. On one side, then, 
there are the weak, non-writerlyt rote translations produced by wee, 
timourous, reverential beasties cowering in awe of The Original : 
uninhabited strings of words, lip service as void as those uninhabited 
performances one sometimes gets in theatre or classical dance (we've 
all seen the dancer merely going through the motions, or the actor 
mouthing lines instead of acting from inside his character). On the 
other side, there are the writerly, inhabited translations produced by 
strong translators — people who have the talent, the skills, and the 
attitude to take charge. In the hands of such people, even error 
becomes a creative mechanism. 
And it seems to me that carnality — the materiality of the text, 
the sense of "real" and the sense of "subject" it creates — is one of the 
things that make the difference between writerly and rote translation. 
Consider Ted Hughes's wonderfully embodied rendering of the 
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Salmacis and Hermaphroditus story — one of those sexual harassment 
incidents Ovid does so well in the Metamorphoses. Hughes turns his 
teenage Salmacis into a boisterous sexual predator, gifts her with a 
ferocity and a horniness far beyond anything you'd find in your Latin-
English dictionary under flagellum, premere or inhaerere. He 
sexualizes the story right down to its tiniest details : Utque sub 
aequoribus deprensum polypus hostem/continet ex omni dimissis parte 
flagellis (IV, 366-67) comes over to us as : 
And as the octopus — 
a tangle of constrictors, nippled with suckers, 
that drag towards a maw — 
embraces its prey 
Ilia premit commissaque corpore toto/sicut inhaerebat, "pugnes licet, 
inprobe", dixit,/"non tarnen effugies" (IV, 369 - 70) becomes : 
As she crushes her breasts and face against him 
And clings to him as with every inch of her surface. 
"It's no good struggling,' she hisses. 
Berman, I suppose, might have complained that Hughes, here, 
a dépassé les textures de l'original et enfreint ainsi l'éthique de la 
traduction1. I disagree : these details are all latent in the original 
formulation, for the textures of a poem extend far below its surface, 
and offer writerly possibilities for the translator who has the talent to 
recognize and reactualize them. Hughes has worked with the substance, 
not the form, of the poem's contents; with his sense of body, his sense 
of visuals, he has instinctively chosen latent features to bring to the 
surface, instinctively decided how he wanted to actualize the 
potentialities of the rather more abstract dixit and premit commissaque 
corpore toto sicut inhaerebat8. 
Plath, in her diary (which makes this story writing, not 
anecdote), tells of her first encounter with Hughes at a Cambridge 
party, Hughes and Plath both drunk, both on the make, he ripping her 
earrings and headband off, she biting his face till the blood ran, a 
perfect match for each other in terms of sheer inventive horniness. The 
story (independently of its value as verifiable fact) is immensely 
moving now she's dead and he is too; its animal energy has somehow 
migrated into Hughes's rewrite of the Salmacis episode. Hughes's 
version gives the twentieth century English reader something of the 
jouissance Ovid's contemporaries must have had — the physical, 
7
 "Le contrat fondamental qui lie une traduction à l'original interdit tout 
dépassement de la texture de Voriginar (Berman, 1985, p. 58). 
8
 Literally : " She presses [against him], clinging [to him] with her entire body, 
as if attached". 
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sensual, esthetic, emotional and cerebral pleasures, all at once. This, in 
a word, is appropriation at its most glorious. 
Writerly translation, in short, is about mastery, both of the real 
and of the means of textual production. Which brings me to what I 
perceive as the talent gap between poets and translators. Untrendy as it 
may be to say so, my feeling is that translators of poetry are distinctly 
less talented, on the average, than the poets they translate. (Just as 
translators of scientific texts are usually, and almost by definition, less 
gifted as scientists than the authors whose texts they render.) Pouvoir-
dire (to use Annie Brisset's term) isn't just about external constraints 
(the iron-fisted institution littéraire)', it's also about individual deficits. 
While it may or may not be true that Maurice Edgar Coindreau 
"couldn 't have got away with" translating the vernaculars of Faulkner's 
novels, it's abundantly clear that a) Coindreau might have been hard 
pressed to find suitable vernaculars in the Hexagonal sociolectal 
configuration (the old problem of anisomorphism), b) even if 
equivalently marked vernaculars were available, it's unlikely that a 
city-slicker like Coindreau would have had the sort of direct, day-to-
day familiarity Faulkner and Steinbeck had with the vernaculars they 
used as raw material, and finally c) if Coindreau had anything like the 
talent of a Faulkner, he would have been writing novels of his own, not 
translating. 
And even aside from questions of talent, as with all other areas 
of translation, there's a gap at the level of ownership (and not just in 
the relatively trivial sense of intellectual property rights and payment). 
The author writes out of what she knows, the translator is forced to tag 
along. Few and far between are the translators of Faulkner and 
Steinbeck who have the same gut knowledge of places and vernaculars 
Faulkner and Steinbeck did; Marie-Odile Fortier-Masek finds herself 
all of a sudden having to build bridges and dismantle bombs in the 
wake of a Michael Ondaatje. No author would risk compromising the 
integrity of her novel by writing out of a world she had no real grasp 
of, but the translator bloody well has to. 
Finally, there's an attitude gap (yes, attitude in the street 
sense). As opposed to the poet translating, the translator (or the 
academic translating) is less willing to take ownership of the real of the 
text and the text of the text. Consider a short sample of the way 
Eugenio Montale's "Notizie dall'Amiata" has been translated by both 






News from Amiata 
II fuoco d'artifizio del 
maltempo 
sarà murmure d'arnie 
a tarda sera. 
La stanza ha travature 





risalgono una valle 
d'elfi e di fimghi fino 
al cono diafano 
della cima 
m'intorbidano i vetri, 
e ti scrivo di qui, da 
questo tavolo 
remoto, dalla cellula 
di miele 
di una sfera lanciata 
nello spazio... 
The fireworks of 
threatening weather 
might be murmur of hives 
at duskfall. 
The room has pockmarked 
beams 
and an odor of melons 
seeps from the store-room. 
Soft mists 
that climb from a valley 
of elves and mushrooms to 
the diaphanous cone 
of the crest cloud over 
windows 
and I write you from here, 
from this table, 
remote, from the honey cell 





the ugly weather's fire-cracker 
simmer 
will deepen to the gruff buzz of 
beehives. 
Termites tunnel the public room's 
rafters to sawdust, 
an odor of bruised melons oozes 
from the floor. 
A sick smoke lifts from the elf-
huts and funghi of the valley — 
like an eagle climbs our 
mountain's bald cone, 
and soils the windows. 
I drag my table to the window, 
and write to you — 
here on this mountain, in this 
beehive cell 
on the globe rocketed through 
space. 
Brandeis's rendering is what I would call a "no-name 
translation". Ilfuoco d'artifizio del maltempo/sarà murmure d'amie a 
tarda sera becomes The fireworks of threatening weather/might be 
murmur of hives at duskfall; Le fumate/morbide che risalgono una 
valle/d'elfi e di funghi fino al cono diafanoldella cima m'intorbidano i 
vetri gets rendered as Soft mists/that climb from a valley/of elves and 
mushrooms to the diaphanous cone/of the crest cloud over my 
windows. Brandeis seems trapped in the words of the source poem, 
incapable of entering, or knowing (in the carnal sense) the world the 
poem opens onto. Rote translation can only deal with the already 
lexicalized : the room has pockmarked [ < tarlate] beams, writes Irma 
Brandeis, and soft mists [...] cloud over my windows and I write you 
from herefrom this table. Brandeis gets so hung up on micro-structural 
details she deals incorrectly with longer spans of syntax : sarà 
murmure d'amie a tarda sera gets mistranslated as might be murmur 
of hives at duskfall — an odd mistake, and a telling one, in a 
translation that is clearly so preoccupied mûi fidelity. 
Where Brandeis works word-bound, stumbling over the 
surface of the text, Robert Lowell takes the image, makes the sounds 
and visuals his, and runs with them. A sick smoke lifts from the elf-huts 
and funghi of the valley [...] and soils the windows, writes Lowell, and 
Termites tunnel the public room 's rafters to sawdust, and Come night, 
the ugly weather's fire-cracker simmer will deepen to the gruff buzz of 
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beehives : note the visual and verbal and rhythmical expansion, the 
adequation of sound to referent. Lowell, here, is writing more or less 
directly out of the "real" triggered by the source text in his head and 
gut, not through the scrim of somebody else's words—pace 
Meschonnic9. At the level of both sound and image the latent 
potentialities of Montale's poem are actualized, in Lowell's poem, and 
made flesh — yet another illustration of the fact that the textures of a 
poem extend well below its surface, offering latent possibilities for the 
writerly translator to actualize. 
The derivative, non-writerly translator is happy to stay within 
the safe reaches of the bilingual dictionary. The words on the page in 
front of him are static and hugely inertial artifacts — a Patrimony 
(hence the anxious, never-ending questionings about just how far one is 
"allowed" to go with The Author's Original). Which is why rote 
translation is of next to no use in poetry, where words are things-to-do-
things-with (to such an extent that I'm tempted to go full circle and see 
poetic language, paradoxically, as the most instrumental of all the uses 
of language). The difference between a rote translator like Brandeis 
and a poet like Lowell is much like the difference between the run-of-
the-mill physics undergraduate who, when asked to come up with an 
explanation of gyroscopic motion, will "learn the various formulae 
involving conservation of angular momentum, and produce an 
explanation in a relatively mechanical and formulaic fashion", and the 
young David Böhm, who, needing "a direct perception of the inner 
nature of this motion" resorted to imagining himself a gyroscope (Peat, 
1997, p. 36). 
Both Brandeis and Lowell make the occasional outright error. 
But it's interesting to compare the types of errors they make. Where 
Brandeis has misread the verb form sarà, Lowell is wrong about 
morbide (which actually does mean something like Brandeis's soft), 
and renders it as sick. Lowell's sick throws its coloration over the entire 
piece, generating the dysphoric drag my table to the window, dirty 
green serge, soils, etc. Assuredly, this is a misreading. But A sick 
smoke lifts from the elf-huts andfunghi of the valley [...] and soils the 
windows is writing, writing that creates a sense of place, and 
atmosphere. Lowell's misreading, I'm convinced, is more than just an 
inadequate knowledge of the source language; it's very close to what 
Harold Bloom has called misprision, the strong poet's defence 
mechanism against invasion by a strong predecessor. Brandeis's Soft 
9
 Dire que l'écrivain va du réel au livre et le traducteur d'un livre à un livre, 
c 'était méconnaître [...] qu 'ily a toujours déjà eu des livres entre l'expérience 
et le livre (Meschonnic, 1973, p. 360). Bien entendu! Our readings, like every 
other aspect of our experience, get absorbed into the consciousness we bring to 
the world. But the rote translator, fixated on the words in front of him, is 
incapable of marshalling this agrégate experience to help him "see through" to 
a " real" behind the set of words he has in front of him. 
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mists that climb from a valley of elves and mushrooms [...] cloud over 
my windows fails to go beyond mere lexical equivalence. Lowell's 
trajectory could be summed up as poem to world, and world to poem. 
Where poets like Lowell create a sense of world behind their 
words, rote translators produce texts that are defective, texts that fail to 
create, "behind them", a sense of "real" and a sense of "subject" — 
which is just another way of saying that rote translations, useful as they 
may be as cribs or introductions, fail to be poems. 
For me there's not the slightest doubt that Lowell's text is 
superior to Brandeis's, whether you use the critic's yardstick or the 
poet's intuition to do your comparing10 : Brandeis's is a no-name string 
of words, a preliminary translation, maybe, but not a full-fledged 
poem. Yet, when I presented this corpus at a departmental seminar, 
Lowell's rendering went over like a lead balloon : there were 
mutterings of qu 'est-ce qui permet de dire que le texte de Brandeis 
n'est pas un poème, and more mutterings oî c'est du Lowell c'est pas 
du Móntale {peut-être bien : mais mieux vaut du Lowell que de la 
Brandéis). And ages ago an academic by the name of José-Luis Ramos 
voiced similar objections to what he called Lowell's "egotistical" 
rendering of a sonnet by Quevedo : Lowell, among other things, he 
complained, "changes all the visual imagery from stone context to the 
wood context of New England" (Ramos, 1980, p. 384). What Ramos 
of course failed to see was that Lowell, in reactualising Quevedo's 
sonnet, "lui avait donné le grain de son vécu à lui [Lowell], ... les 
rugosités de l'expérientiel avec lequel lui se trouvait dans le même 
rapport d'authenticité que Quevedo avec son Espagne du XVIe siècle" 
(Folkart, 1991, pp. 422-423). Even theorists have a hard time getting 
away from the idea that translation must be more of the same, firmly 
ensconsed in the already-said. 
The oddest thing is that Lowell's derived poem is vastly 
superior to Brandeis's string of words, not only on its own terms, but 
equally by reference to the Móntale from which it derives. Brandeis's 
rendering, even at the purely semiotic level, is flawed by internal 
inconsistencies that rob it of coherence. Seen as an "equivalent" to 
10
 The critical model, being, of course, an after-the-fact approximation to the 
poet's intuition. I'm no longer inclined to the use of grids and hyper-grids 
(there are faster ways to get the same results), so I'll limit myself to pointing 
out, in Lowell's poem, the instinctive way patternings of voiced and unvoiced 
items are played off against one another, buzz vs sick smoke, so that the Izl 
sound-field that peaks in the voiced buzz plays off against the unvoiced Isl 
items accumulating a few lines on (where Lowell's play on iff and /s/ matches 
Montale's lilvl play). While Brandeis's lines inevitably contain voiced and 
unvoiced items, such items are distributed sporadically, with no sign of an 
intuitively organised patterning comparable to the way Isl 'deepens' to /z/, in 
the early lines of Lowell's poem, then softens back to Isl. 
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Móntale, it's plain inaccurate. Just the difference between fireworks 
md fire-cracker simmer encapsulates the superiority of Lowell's poem. 
Fire-cracker simmer gives a far better representation of the real to 
which Montale's poem points, both in terms of motivation (the sound-
to-referent adequation of fire-cracker simmer) and denotationally 
(Montale's/i/oco d'artifizio is far-off thunder heard on an afternoon of 
mists wisping around the mountain — sound, that is, not visuals. Fire-
cracker simmer is perfect for that intermittent crackle petering out at 
the end of the day (murmure), whereas the visual pyrotechnics of 
Brmdeis's fireworks are utterly incompatible with the "soft mist" that 
comes creeping up from the valley, just a few lines later). 
But Robert Lowell, I guess, just rubs academics the wrong 
way when he translates. Tant pis pour les universitaires] Ultimately, I 
would claim, the people who keep getting scandalized by the poems 
Robert Lowell derives from other people's work are showing their 
indefectable attachment to a certain conception of what translation has 
to be. It's not just the practitioners who cleave to the already-said. A 
good many theorists, whatever the ideological colouring of their 
writings, have a tendency to behave as if translation must not only 
replicate the source text, but must be seen to replicate it. This is 
theoretical lockjaw, intensely hostile to any suggestion that translation 
might be considered as a playful,, potentially innovative activity. 
Inevitably, this iron-fisted, Loi-du-Père mindset obscures what actually 
turn out to be finer, or higher, or deeper levels of equivalence. 
As will be obvious from the way I've set this essay up, I take 
issue quite strongly with the notion that the "instrumental", or 
"utilitarian" discourse of science and technology has somehow 
contaminated, let alone taken over, the way we see translation.11 Yes, 
it's perfectly true that the denotational approach, the emphasis on 
(immediate) propositional content, is deeply rooted in both the practice 
and the theory of translation. But this dominance of the denotational 
has nothing to do with the supposed "imperialism" of scientific and 
technical discourse. It's an offshoot of the dominance, in both the 
practice and the theory of translation, of the replicative mindset, which 
puts "fidelity", or the more respectable "accuracy", ahead of the 
intrinsic quality of the target text. And "replicative" works out to be 
"denotational", more often than not, since accuracy is easier to discern 
at the level of small structures and short spans of meaning. 
11
 This notion is by way of becoming something of a topos in translation 
studies : see Venuti, The Translator's Invisibility, 1995, pp. 5-6, and the call 
for papers for this colloquium, which speaks of "un monde dominé par la 
technologie où I 'on tend à privilégier la fonction 'utilitaire ' de la traduction et 
à sous-estimer les textes qui ne s'identifient pas immédiatement avec la 
technoscience ou les discours de savoir". 
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This is an impoverishment of the potential field of meaning 
suggested by the designation trans-latio. A more productive 
understanding of the term would lead to at least four nested categories : 
metatexts, the set of all possible transformations of the source-text; 
next, the subset of allolingual metatexts; then, inventive translation, or 
the subset of allolingual transformations which conserve the deep-
structure hierarchy of functionally relevant features; and finally 
replicative translation, which requires that surface structures as well be 
carried over, right down to the denotational level (which is fine for 
instrumental discourse, for verse translation and for cribs, but of next to 
no use in rendering poetry as poetry). 
The oddest thing of all, perhaps, is that while translation 
studies continues to grunt away behind an essentially "replicative" 
view of translation (quitte à fourrer tout le reste dans la catégorie 
proprement indéfinissable de l'adavtation\ the most informed 
"donneurs d'ouvrage", so to speak, are calling for something quite 
different. Here's classicist Donald Carne-Ross talking about 
Christopher Logue's notoriously freewheeling, and notoriously 
splendid "Patrocleia" : 
Logue, unencumbered by Greek scholarship [...], has 
managed to get inside [Homer's] poem again and has 
discovered that, after all these years, it is still breathing. 
[....] thanks to his irresponsible behaviour, Homer is on 
the move once more. The genie is out of the bottle. (Carne-Ross, 1963, p. 63) 
Classical historian James Davidson goes even further. Reviewing a 
competent but uncompelling translation of Apollonius of Rhodes's 
Argonautika, he has this to say : "[...] perhaps it is time for liberties to 
be taken. It would be interesting to see the Argonautika violated" — 
yes, he does say violated, and he spins his metaphor a bit further — "it 
would be interesting to see the Argonautika violated by a less brawny 
version of Christopher Logue" (Davidson, 1998, p. 9). 
The Hellenists and presumably the Latinists, in short, are all 
for having poets go at the classical texts hammer and tongs 
(metaphorically speaking, of course). But we translation studies people 
know better than the poets — don't we? 
University of Ottawa 
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ABSTRACT : Poetry as Knowing — Like the pure sciences, poetry is 
first and foremost a cognitive instrument, one of the most rigorous 
modes of knowing that exist. Everything about it is shaped by the 
search for insight, or even truth. Poets are no more in the business of 
"making pretty" than molecular biologists or computer nerds; they put 
us into un-mediated contact with the grid of the world, force us to dig 
deeper than ever before into the amorphous business of being. 
This they do by "making it new". Poetry is a "counter 
idiomatic" practise, one that grates against the words of the tribe, its 
received ideas and its verities. And "form" — whether "free" or forged 
out of constraints — plays an all-important part in making it new for 
us. Form is decorative only to the illiterate. For the competent receiver, 
it is acutely, intensely functional. 
By giving it form, making it new, forcing us out of the 
lexicalized varieties that have gone stale on us, poetry makes us feel 
our way to new truths, or to a gut knowledge of old ones. Hence the 
maïeutic function of poetry. 
The very fact that poetry is so intolerant of the already-said is 
what explains the irreplicability or what Berman referred to as la lettre 
and makes the poem refractory to translation. Yet, most practitioners 
conceive of translation as a way of replicating what's already there. It's 
hard to imagine a more anti-poetic stance. 
RÉSUMÉ : Poésie et connaissance — Comme les sciences pures, la 
poésie est avant tout une entreprise cognitive tendue tout entière vers la 
recherche de vérités voire de la Vérité. Son propos n'est nullement de 
« faire joli » : pas plus que la biologie moléculaire ou l'astro-physique, 
elle ne vise à être un art d'agrément. Elle cherche au contraire à entrer 
plus avant dans la matière brute du monde, nous incitant de ce fait à 
fouiller le flou de notre existence. 
Pour ce faire, la poésie travaille en marge du langage reçu. 
Pratique contre-idiomatique, elle s'insurge contre le déjà-perçu, le déjà-
lexicalisé, le déjà-dit. Et la mise en forme poétique — qu'elle soit 
« libre» ou bâtie à partir de contraintes prosodiques—joue un rôle 
primordial dans cette entreprise de décapage et de découverte. La 
forme du poème n'est décorative qu'à l'ignare. Pour qui sait lire, elle 
est fonctionnelle au plus haut degré. 
En donnant forme à l'informe, en bouleversant nos habitudes 
langagières, perceptuelles et cognitives, la poésie nous arrache à nos 
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vérités toutes faites. Elle nous force à arriver par la voie de l'affectivité 
à des connaissances neuves, ou à une saisie viscérale de ce que nous 
pensions savoir déjà. D'où sa fonction maïeutique. 
C'est le refus du déjà-dit qui fonde la singularité du langage 
poétique et qui rend la poésie réfiractaire à la traduction. La plupart des 
traducteurs, cependant, envisagent la traduction comme affaire de 
replication. On ne saurait méconnaître plus radicalement la dynamique 
de la poésie. 
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